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We introduce the idea of a beable-guided quantum theory. Beable-guided quantum theories
(BGQT) are generalisations of quantum theory, inspired by Bell’s concept of beables. They modify
the quantum probabilities for some specified set of fundamental events, histories, or other elements
of quasiclassical reality by probability laws that depend on the realised configuration of beables.
For example, they may define an additional probability weight factor for a beable configuration,
independent of the quantum dynamics.
BGQT can be fitted to observational data to provide foils against which to compare explanations
based on standard quantum theory. For example, a BGQT could, in principle, characterise the
effects attributed to dark energy or dark matter, or any other deviation from the predictions of
standard quantum dynamics, without introducing extra fields or a cosmological constant. The
complexity of the beable-guided theory would then parametrise how far we are from a standard
quantum explanation.
Less conservatively, we give reasons for taking suitably simple beable-guided quantum theories
as serious phenomenological theories in their own right. Among these are that cosmological models
defined by BGQTmight in fact fit the empirical data better than any standard quantum explanation,
and that BGQT suggest potentially interesting non-standard ways of coupling quantum matter to
gravity.
INTRODUCTION
“Considering the pervasive importance of quantum mechanics in modern physics, it is odd how rarely
one hears of efforts to test quantum mechanics experimentally with high precision. . . . The trouble is that
it is very difficult to find any logically consistent generalization of quantum mechanics.”
(Steven Weinberg, in Testing Quantum Mechanics [37])
Weinberg’s paper [37] exploring ideas about nonlinear generalizations of quantum theory, from which the quotation
above is taken, led to some fundamental insights about the relationship between quantum theory and special relativity
[15, 30]. In fact, applied to non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the quotation was already contradicted by dynamical
collapse models [13, 14]. Nonetheless, the belief that generalizations of quantum theory must be inconsistent or at
least suffer from some fundamental sickness remains widespread. In particular, the fact that Weinberg’s nonlinear
generalizations of quantum theory allow superluminal signalling [15, 30] (or, it was argued, inter-universe signalling
[30]) seem to have persuaded many that relativistic quantum theory, at least, probably is in some strong sense an
isolated point in theory space. Recent no-go theorems [5, 6, 31] may have helped reinforce this impression.
None of these no-go results actually imply this conclusion, however (nor do their authors argue that they do). And in
fact, if one is open-minded about the mathematical constructions one can use, the rules one can postulate, and the ways
in which quantum laws can be generalized, it is not hard to define logically consistent and potentially scientifically
interesting generalizations of quantum mechanics that do not conflict with special relativity. For example, there
exists an infinite class of consistent nonlinear theories that neither violate Lorentz invariance nor allow superluminal
signalling [25].
This paper describes another infinite class of generalizations of quantum theory. This class includes arbitrarily
baroque theories, but also includes subclasses of relatively simple theories that seem both potentially phenomenolog-
ically useful and interesting in their own right. We discuss their potential scientific implications, expanding an earlier
discussion [22] and setting it in a more general and fundamental context.
No specific BGQT are advocated or compared to empirical data here: the aim here is to make some simple conceptual
points in order to expand the boundaries of future research in several directions.
2BEABLE MODELS
Arguably [38] the key problem in quantum foundations – and one of the key problems in modern physics – is
the apparent impossibility of deriving, from unitary quantum theory alone, an explanation of the appearance of a
quasiclassical world.[39]
The most interesting attempts to make progress on this problem confront it head on, by adding extra mathematical
structure to unitary quantum theory, to define what Bell called beables [1, 2]. The beables are mathematical represen-
tations of particle trajectories, or processes, or events, or histories, or whatever the right concept is for the elementary
quantities from which we can build a description of possible quasiclassical worlds (if the idea works). Beable models are
indeterministic: they assign a probability measure to configurations of beables. This (if it works) implies a probability
measure on possible quasiclassical worlds, and hence implies probabilistic predictions about the quasiclassical world
we experience. In particular, if the beable model is intended to replicate the predictions of quantum theory precisely,
it should be possible in principle to derive the Born rule for quantum experiments from the beable configuration
probability measure. So, on this view, our quasiclassical world is the one that nature randomly chose to be realized
from among all the possible worlds, and is fundamentally defined by some randomly chosen configuration of beables
from among all the possible configurations.
Examples of beables in beable models or proto-models include the particle trajectories in de Broglie-Bohm theories,
the collapse centres in discrete dynamical collapse models, and the real history defined by a time-dependent density
matrix in a real world interpretation [28]. The consistent or decoherent histories approach [12, 17] can and arguably
should [9, 10, 21] also be thought of as a so far unsuccessful attempt at an honest beable model, in which the beables
would be elementary histories from a preferred consistent set defined by an (alas as yet undiscovered) appropriate
quasiclassical set selection rule.
Beables for sceptics
“For those people who insist that the only thing that is important is that the theory agrees with
experiment, I would like to imagine a discussion between a Mayan astronomer and his student. The
Mayans were able to calculate with great precision predictions, for example, for eclipses and for the
position of the moon in the sky, the position of Venus, etc. It was all done by arithmetic. They counted
a certain number, and subtracted some numbers, and so on. There was no discussion of what the moon
was. There was no discussion even of the idea that it went around. They just calculated the time when
there would be an eclipse, or when the moon would rise at the full, and so on. Suppose that a young man
went to the astronomer and said ’I have an idea. Maybe those things are going around, and there are balls
of something like rocks out there, and we could calculate how they move in a completely different way
from just calculating what time they appear in the sky’, ’Yes’, says the astronomer, ’and how accurately
can you predict eclipses?’ He says, ’I haven’t developed the thing very far yet’, Then says the astronomer,
’Well, we can calculate eclipses more accurately than you can with your model, so you must not pay
any attention to your idea because obviously the mathematical scheme is better’. There is a very strong
tendency, when someone comes up with an idea and says, ’Let’s suppose that the world is this way’, for
people to say to him, ’What would you get for the answer to such and such a problem?’ And he says ’I
haven’t developed it far enough’. And they say, ’Well, we have already developed it much further, and
we can get the answers very accurately’. So it is a problem whether or not to worry about philosophies
behind ideas.”
(Richard Feynman, Seeking New Laws [11])
Are existing beable models plausibly fundamentally correct? Almost certainly not. Existing beable models look
ad hoc, more like Heath Robinson [40] constructions than fundamental physical theories. They also have some well
known problems [41] – as (let’s not forget) does every other attempt to date at finding a fundamentally satisfac-
tory understanding of quantum theory. But we don’t necessarily have to find existing beable models theoretically
compelling, or even believe all their problems can be fixed, to make scientific use of them.
Let’s assume that the final theory we’re heading for is as compellingly beautiful as most physicists hope. Still,
it isn’t in sight yet. Why should we be so confident that every step on the path to it involves expressing physical
insights in terms of mathematically beautiful ideas? Maybe a theory unifying quantum theory and gravity, or some
other form of post-quantum theory, will emerge in something like the way quantum theory did, from incomplete ad
3hoc ideas (like Planck’s energy quantization hypothesis), toy models (like the Bohr atom) and partial insights (like
de Broglie’s matter wave hypothesis).
Especially at the moment, when progress on fundamental problems in physics is so stalled, it seems a mistake to
dismiss ideas that achieve something, however unaesthetically. And beable models do, after all, despite their problems,
give a logically straightforward way of resolving the tension between classical and quantum physics – a tension which
has to be resolved somehow. Also in their favour is that – unlike, for example, attempts to make sense of many-worlds
quantum theory [27] – they work within the only tried and tested scientific paradigm we have, in which the aim
of a scientific theory is to define a single objective reality and make standard probabilistic predictions about our
observations of that reality. Those seem good enough reasons to explore whether beable models lead to interesting
and testable new scientific ideas. This paper adds more reasons for believing that they do, and also for believing that
these ideas may be valuable even if beable models eventually turn out to be only rough approximations to a deeper
theory framed using different concepts.
In summary, beable models are potentially useful scientific tools, even for those who query or reject the value of
beables as a physical concept.
BEABLE PROBABILITIES IN STANDARD BEABLE MODELS
Nonrelativistic beable models
We start by characterising abstractly a class of beable models of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, namely time-
local beable theories. In these, we suppose we are given quantum theory with some fixed initial state |ψ(0)〉 at some
initial time t = 0, and some fixed Hamiltonian H , which for simplicity and definiteness we take here to be time-
independent. Our aim is to describe physics, at the most fundamental level, for all times t > 0. The possible beable
configurations take the form of collections B of pairs of beables and (corresponding) times:
B = {(Bt, t) : Bt ∈ Λ(t), t ≥ 0} ,
where each Λ(t) is a set of the beables (some stipulated mathematical quantities) defined for each t ≥ 0. The set Λ(t)
may be empty at some or even generic times t, and need not depend continuously on t.
If the model respects standard quantum dynamics for the state vector, it also includes the standard time-evolved
quantum state |ψ(t)〉 = exp(−iHt/h¯)|ψ(0)〉 as a mathematical object. The quantum state may itself also be defined
to be one of the beables, but it need not necessarily be.
Perhaps the most familiar example of a time-local beable model respecting standard quantum dynamics is standard
non-relativistic de Broglie-Bohm theory [4, 7] applied to a system of N distinguishable particles. Here the quantum
state at time t is |ψ(t)〉, where
〈x1, . . . , xN |ψ(t) 〉 = ψ(x1, . . . , xN ; t) .
We will take the beables at time t to be the position coordinates of the N particle trajectories. (We will not take
the quantum state here to be a beable, although many authors choose to. Both options are possible, and both are
questionable: see footnote [40] above on double ontologies.) So we have
Λ(t) = {x1(t), . . . , xN (t)} .
These follow continuous equations, so in this case Λ(t) depends continuously on t.
Standard de Broglie-Bohm theory makes experimental predictions indistinguishable from those of Copenhagen
quantum theory where both apply, in the following sense: we can always recover the Bohmian predictions for qua-
siclassical physics in the Copenhagen formalism by finding some suitably macroscopic system A that undergoes an
effectively irreversible measurement interaction with the measured quantum system S, and treating A as though
it follows quasiclassical dynamical laws rather than quantum laws. However, de Broglie-Bohm theory gives precise
dynamical equations from which the quasiclassical behaviour of such objects can be derived, rather than separately
postulated. De Broglie-Bohm theory can also be straightforwardly be applied to closed quantum systems and can
describe the emergence of quasiclassical physics within closed systems. Copenhagen quantum theory, on the other
hand, relies on the imprecise concept of a separate classical realm through which the quantum realm is probed and
measured, and does not apply to closed quantum systems.
An example of a time-local beable model that respects standard quantum dynamics for the state vector but makes
distinct predictions from standard quantum theory is Valentini’s modified de Broglie-Bohm theory [35, 36], which
4follows the de Broglie-Bohm guidance equation but has a non-standard initial condition on the particle trajectories
at t = 0:
P (x1(0), . . . , xN (0)) 6= |ψ(x1, . . . , xN ; 0)|
2 .
An example of a time-local beable model that does not respect standard quantum dynamics, and that also makes
distinct predictions from standard quantum theory, is the original Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber discrete dynamical collapse
model [13]. We consider it here in the form first suggested by Bell [3] (see also e.g. [20, 34]), where the beables
are the (isolated) space-time points about which the collapses are centred. Here, for a system of N distinguishable
particles, at generic times t there are no collapses and hence no beables: Λ(t) = { }. If a collapse centred about x
occurs for particle i at time t then Λ(t) = {(x, i)}. In cases where M ≥ 2 collapses occur at exactly the same time t
collapses at time t, we have Λ(t) = {(x1, i1), . . . , (xM , iM )}. (We include these cases for completeness, although the
total probability measure for such multiple collapse events, integrated over all time, is zero.) As the GRW model
illustrates, Λ(t) need not necessarily depend continuously on t in a physically sensible time-local beable model.
In summary, a time-local beable model defines the possible sets of time-labelled beables,
B = {(Bt, t) : Bt ∈ Λ(t), t ≥ 0} ,
takes as input the initial quantum state |ψ(0)〉 and the Hamiltonian H and from these data computes as output a
probability measure µ(B) on the sample space of allowed sets B. The measure depends on |ψ(0)〉 and H : if we think
of these as fixed by some particular theory T , we may write µ ≡ µT to emphasize that the beable configuration
probabilities depend on the (quantum) theory.
While these familiar examples of beable models are time-local, we can also imagine more general types of beable
model. For example, each beable might be associated with an extended region of space-time.[42] We can extend the
above characterisation to more general beable models, since nothing in our abstract definitions relies on time-locality.
Thus, given a theory T defining |ψ(0)〉 and H , a beable model defines the possible sets of beables B and a probability
measure µT (B).
Relativistic beable models
Relativistic beable models have proved harder to construct – perhaps unsurprisingly, given that we have no mathe-
matically rigorous construction even of non-trivial relativistic quantum field theories in 3 + 1-dimensional Minkowski
space-time.[43]
We can straightforwardly extend our abstract characterization of beable models to quantum field theory in
Minkowski space and quantum cosmology. This turns out to be useful, despite the paucity of familiar concrete
examples: see the discussion of coarse-grainings in cosmological models below.
A Lorentz invariant beable model defines the possible sets of beables B and computes a probability measure µT (B)
from a theory T defining the Hamiltonian H and some asymptotic past boundary condition ψ−∞ = limS→−∞ |ψS〉
on the quantum state associated with spacelike hypersurfaces S tending to past infinity, by Lorentz covariant rules.
Similarly, a generally covariant beable model in quantum cosmology uses generally covariant rules to define the
possible sets of beables B and compute a probability measure µT (B), given a generally covariant theory T defining
the quantum evolution law and some initial condition postulate (for example, the no-boundary condition).
BEABLE-GUIDED QUANTUM THEORY
“Inert, uninfluential, a simple passenger in the voyage of life, it is allowed to remain on board, but not
to touch the helm or handle the rigging.”
(William James, Are We Automata? [19]).
There is something unsettlingly epiphenomenal about the status of the beables in standard quantum beable theories.
The quantum state evolution does all the mathematical work in defining the beable probability distribution; the
beables, so to speak, hitch a free ride.
While some non-standard beable theories give the beables at least a little more of a role, it is still a secondary one.
For example, in Valentini’s modified Bohmian theory [35, 36], the evolution of the Bohmian particle trajectories
throughout time is determined by the quantum state, just as in ordinary de Broglie-Bohm theory: the only difference
5is that the probability distribution of the initial Bohmian particle positions is chosen independently of the initial
quantum state. Granted, this is a significant difference, and has intriguing consequences, but the dynamics remain
determined by the quantum state throughout.
In GRWP dynamical collapse models [13, 14], there is a genuine interplay between the quantum state and collapse
events: the quantum state at time t depends on all previous collapse events as well as on the initial state and
Hamiltonian. Again, this is a significant generalization of standard quantum theory. Still, in at least one sense the
quantum state still plays a dominant role: the probability of a collapse taking place at any given point in Galilean
space-time is entirely determined by the quantum state at that time. Indeed, all of physics, including the beable
probability distributions after time t, are determined by the quantum state at time t.
To be fair, each of these pioneering examples of generalizations of quantum theory has its own internal logic that
provides motivation for the beables playing precisely the role they do. Maybe one of these theories, or a theory in
which the beables play a similar and similarly secondary role, will indeed turn out to be a better description of nature
than standard non-relativistic quantum theory.
However, we see a compelling motivation to explore ways of setting the beables on a still more equal footing with
the quantum state – hence the idea of beable-guided quantum theories, to which we now turn.
Beable configuration probability weights and probabilities
The theory T that defines the initial quantum state and Hamiltonian still defines a probability measure µT (B), as
above. However, µT (B) no longer defines the probability of the beable configuration B.
Instead, we take the actual probability measure of the beable configuration B in a beable-guided quantum theory
to be some function
µ′T (B) = f(µT (B), B)
that depends on the quantum probability measure and on the beable configuration.
This gives a very large class of possibilities indeed. To be a little more concrete, while still allowing a large class of
possibilities that includes many interesting generalizations of quantum theory, in what follows we will illustrate the
idea by considering product functions of the form
f(µT (B), B) = CµT (B)w(B) ,
where w(B) is a real non-negative weight function. The normalised probability measure is then
µ′T (B) = µT (B)w(B)(
∫
B′
µT (B
′)w(B′))−1 .
What defines the weight function w(B)? We have defined w(B) to be a function only of the beable configuration B,
independent of the initial quantum state and Hamiltonian, and to be non-negative and real. Modulo these constraints,
in principle, any rule at all is allowed. We have (even in this restricted class) an uncountably infinite class of theories.
However, in the most interesting cases, the rules defining w(B) should be relatively simple.
It is worth stressing again here that the wave function |ψ(t)〉 may be included in the beable set B. If it is, a beable-
guided quantum theory may be governed by probability rules that explicitly depend on the set {|ψ(t)〉}−∞<t<∞ or on
selected subsets. Similarly, relativistic BGQT that include hypersurface-dependent wave functions |ψ(S)〉 as beables
may be governed by probability rules that explicitly depend on {|ψ(S)〉}S .
Examples of rules for weight functions
Simple Bohmian examples
To give a simple example, we could define a beable-guided quantum theory from a non-relativistic Bohmian model
of two particles with Bohmian trajectories B = {x1(t), x2(t)}t, taking
w(B) = exp(−(lim supt(x1(t)− x2(t))
2/a2)) .
This is fairly easy to understand intuitively, although rather ad hoc: compared to the standard Bohmian model, pairs
of trajectories are more or less likely to be selected depending on the closest separation they ever attain.
6A variation that perhaps might appear a little more natural, for a model universe of finite duration, from time 0 to
T , is
w(B) = T−1
∫ T
0
dt exp(−((x1(t)− x2(t))
2/a2)) ,
which prefers pairs of trajectories that stay close over time, with respect to a simple measure. Note however that the
limit
w(B) = lim
T→∞
T−1
∫ T
0
dt exp(−((x1(t)− x2(t))
2/a2))
may not lead to well-defined beable configuration probabilities in general, since in many examples almost all configu-
rations (with respect to the standard measure) have w(B) = 0.[44]
To reiterate, any rule at all is allowed in principle. A more baroque, less intuitively interpretable, and presumably
correspondingly less interesting example is given by
w(B) = α exp(−(
∫
0≤t≤1
(x1(t)− x2(t))
2/a2)) + β exp(−(max2≤t≤6(x1(t)− x2(t))
2/b2))
+γθ(maxt(x1(t))
2 − c2) + δ cos2(maxt(x
2
1(t)− x
2
2(t+ T ))) ,
where α, β, γ, δ, a, b, c, T are positive constants and θ is the Heaviside step function.
A simple collapse model example
A simple beable-guided version of a non-relativistic Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model for two distinguishable particles
for times t ≥ 0, with collapse events taking place at {x1i , t
1
i }
∞
i=1 and {x
2
i , t
2
i }
∞
i=1, is defined by
w({x1i , t
1
i }, {x
2
i , t
2
i }) = inf
i,i′
exp(−(t1i − t
2
i′)
2/T 2) exp(−(x1i − x
2
i′)
2/X2) ,
for constants X,T . Roughly speaking, this tends to favour collapse event histories that include a pair of collapse
events for the two particles that are nearby in space and time with respect to the scales X,T .
COARSE-GRAININGS OF BEABLES IN COSMOLOGICAL MODELS
Simple non-relativistic beable-guided quantum theories based on de Broglie-Bohm theory, the GRW model, or other
familiar beable theories make testably different predictions from standard quantum theory. They suggest new ways
of parametrising experimental and observational tests of quantum mechanics.
However, the class of theories, and so parametrisations, is infinite. No one beable-guided quantum theory leaps out
as a clearly more compelling candidate than the rest. Also, while intrinsically non-relativistic theories might possibly
still suggest interesting cosmological tests, they are obviously fundamentally flawed, and so at best of limited use, as
cosmological models. Can we get any further?
Beable-guided quantum cosmological theories: problems
Cosmology poses the sternest test of quantum theory as a universal theory, and so seems the likeliest arena where
observation might help select potentially physically relevant beable-guided quantum theories. Among the problems
are: we don’t have a quantum theory of gravity; we don’t have anything approaching a standard quantum cosmological
model that starts from a simple theory of initial conditions and fits all the data; ideas about Lorentz covariant beable
models are works in progress; ideas about generally covariant beable models are less substantial still.
7Phenomenological BGQTs
Building a BGQT cosmological theory from fundamental first principles may not necessarily be the most fruitful
approach. To test a cosmological beable model – or any quantum cosmological theory – we don’t necessarily need
a fine-grained description of the beables. The first key test is whether the model explains (insofar as a probabilistic
theory can) the features of the observed universe. For this we need to characterize the possible (mostly) quasiclassical
worlds that might be realized in any given theory – which we can describe in terms of higher-level physical quantities
that the elementary beables must characterize. In any successful beable quantum theory, quasiclassical parameters –
the approximate density of matter in a small region, the average distance between galaxies, the size of the universe (if
finite) at any given cosmological time – must be characterized by the beables, at least to a very good approximation.
In other words, quasiclassical parameters must, to good approximation, be functions of the elementary beables, and
hence must effectively be higher-order beables. We can define higher-level phenomenological beable-guided quantum
theories directly in terms of these parameters.
So, insofar as we can talk about quantum cosmological models at all (and we do, despite all the theoretical and
conceptual problems) we can also talk about beable-guided quantum cosmological theories. If we have covariantly
defined quasiclassical parameters, we can use them to construct covariantly defined beable-guided quantum cosmo-
logical theories. Theories of this sort were proposed in Ref. [22]: the present discussion sets them in a more general
and maybe more fundamentally appealing context.
For example, any of the covariant definitions of quasiclassical event explored in the consistent histories literature
might be used to define a beable-guided cosmological theory. In particular, we can use covariant notions of event
defined via path integrals [18]. We could, for instance [22] define quantum cosmologies for an expanding universe with
a cosmological time coordinate in which we stipulate in advance that, when the compact 3-metric has volume Vi, the
matter inhomogeneities are of scale somewhere in the range (δmini , δ
max
i ), for some sequence V1 < V2 < . . . < Vn < . . .
of increasing volumes. More generally, we could define a probabilistic theory of this type: the probability distribution
for the sequence {δi} is p({δi}). We can also consider continuous versions of such theories, defined by appropriate
limits.
Similarly, we can define models for a finite universe that deterministically or probabilistically constrain the scale
of the universe, or the average separation between galaxies, or any other quasiclassical quantity, as a function of
cosmological time.
Again, of course, this gives us an infinite class of theories, including arbitrarily baroque ones as well as some quite
simple ones. Collectively, these theories seem ideally designed as foils against which to test the postulate that initial
causes and standard evolution laws together explain everything that can be explained in physics [22]. They can also
be used as foils for earlier non-standard theories, for example in testing the alternative postulate explored in the
two-time cosmology literature, that initial and final causes, together with the Hamiltonian, suffice. They are also
potentially interesting non-standard theories in their own right.
BEABLE-GUIDED QUANTUM THEORY AND GRAVITY
The problems in unifying quantum theory and gravity are notoriously deep. We do not have a consistent quantum
theory of gravity, nor a clear conceptual understanding of how a picture of macroscopic events taking place in a
space-time with an apparently relatively well-defined large-scale structure could emerge from one if we did. We don’t
know that a quantum theory of gravity (in any conventional sense) is even what we should be looking for.
Beable-guided quantum theories suggest a different way of thinking about quantum theory and gravity. Quantum
theory appears to be a good description of the behaviour of matter, at least at small scales. The gravitational field
appears to define the structure of a definite associated space-time, at least at large scales. Whether the gravitational
field is fundamentally quantum or classical or something else, it seems to behave, at large scales, like a higher-level
beable, giving a unique and definite picture of reality associated with the quantum evolution of the universe. Supposing
this is correct – i.e. that large-scale features of space-time are defined as higher-level functions of fundamental beables
– we can use BGQT as a framework for defining consistent theories in which the gravitational field satisfies interesting
constraints. These constraints need not necessarily arise from standard expectations or intuitions about quantum
theory and gravity. We can also consider constraints that only make sense if one is looking for a new physical
principle embodied in a new type of theory, such as a BGQT.
One example of such a constraint, which is a useful foil against which to test standard expectations, is to impose
by fiat that the gravitational field must be locally causal, in a sense that naturally generalizes Bell’s definition of local
causality to metric theories [26].
8Define a past region in a metric spacetime to be a region which contains its own causal past, and the domain of
dependence of a region R in a spacetime S to be the set of points p such that every endless past causal curve through
p intersects R.
Suppose that we have identified a specified past region of spacetime Λ, with specified metric and matter fields, and
let κ be any fixed region with specified metric and matter fields.
Let Λ′ be another past region, again with specified metric and matter fields. (In the cases we are most interested
in, Λ ∩ Λ′ will be non-empty, and thus necessarily also a past region.)
Define
Prob(κ|Λ ⊥ Λ′)
to be the probability that the domain of dependence of Λ will be isometric to κ, given that Λ ∪ Λ′ form part of
space-time, and given that the domains of dependence of Λ and Λ′ are space-like separated regions.
Let κ′ be another fixed region of spacetime with specified metric and matter fields.
Define
Prob(κ|Λ ⊥ Λ′;κ′)
to be the probability that the domain of dependence of Λ will be isometric to κ, given that Λ ∪ Λ′ form part of
space-time, that the domain of dependence of Λ′ is isometric to κ′, and that the domains of dependence of Λ and Λ′
are space-like separated.
We say a metric theory of space-time is locally causal if for all such Λ,Λ′, κ and κ′ the relevant conditional proba-
bilities are defined by the theory and satisfy
Prob(κ|Λ ⊥ Λ′) = Prob(κ|Λ ⊥ Λ′;κ′) .
The standard expectation is that our space-time is not locally causal. A Bell experiment in which the measurement
outcomes are amplified macroscopically so that the gravitational fields in space-like separated regions depend on
the outcomes ought to produce non-locally causal correlations in the gravitational fields as well as the measurement
outcomes. A beautiful experiment by Salart et al. [32] addressed the related question [24] of whether we can ensure
that measurements in the two wings of a Bell experiment produce definite outcomes in spacelike separated regions,
if we follow the intuitions proposed by Diosi [8] and Penrose [29] and assume that a definite outcome of a quantum
measurement requires a gravitationally macroscopic superposition to be created.
Salart et al. show the answer is affirmative, if we also accept Penrose and Diosi’s estimates for what constitutes
a gravitationally macroscopic superposition. However, the Bell nonlocality of the gravitational field has not yet
been directly tested. It would be good to do so, since there is some motivation [26] for exploring the idea that the
gravitational field might be locally causal, strange though such a theory would be, and small though our sliver of
doubt on the point may be. It would be easier to see how to write dynamical equations for a quasiclassical metric
theory – easier to see how space-time puts itself together from locally determined pieces – if it were locally causal.
BGQT models incorporating gravity gives a useful way of defining models that serve as the requisite foils.
DISCUSSION
Any generalization of quantum theory can be seen as a foil for testing standard theories, a way of parametrizing
how well any given experiment tests the theory, or how well standard quantum explanations currently fit observational
cosmological data. This is certainly sufficient motivation for thinking about beable-guided quantum theories. Perhaps
these and other generalizations of quantum theory will indeed turn out to be mere foils. Perhaps quantum dynamics
will indeed survive all experimental tests. Perhaps some elegant Lorentz and generally covariant beable extension of
quantum theory and quantum gravity will also explain the appearance of quasiclassicality and the probabilistic and
deterministic laws governing our quasiclassical world.
There is, though, another less conservative motivation for considering beable-guided quantum theories. Beables
give the best way we have of explaining the appearance of quasiclassical physics within a quantum world. But in
existing beable models – even non-standard models such as those of Valentini and Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber-Pearle –
the beables seem unsettlingly epiphenomenal. The quantum dynamics do most or all of the work in defining the
beable probability distribution, yet it is the beables that are supposed to represent physical reality, not the quantum
state. While this is not logically inconsistent, it seems odd that the beables should be simultaneously so physically
important and so passive.
9Beable-guided quantum theories may not completely eliminate this sense of unease. The quantum state still plays
the major role, at least in simple beable-guided theories. And since quantum theory works so well, this is a fairly
inescapable feature, at least in theories describing laboratory experiments. But they do at least reduce the imbalance:
the beables behave more like self-respecting physical quantities.
In short, then, the case for taking beable-guided quantum theories seriously as fundamental theories in their own
right is that we need beables, and then, once we have beables, they should play an active role in physics.
One obvious reason to be sceptical is that – with the crucial exception of explaining the appearance of quasiclassical
physics – standard quantum theory appears to work very well. It seems that any corrections due to a beable-guided
quantum theory must be very small, and yet nothing in known physics suggests any obvious reason to expect a small
correction parameter. But then, similar arguments apply to, for example, the cosmological constant, the ratio between
gravitational and electromagnetic force strengths, the degree of parity violation – and yet the parameters are small
in each case.
There is also a danger of overstating the successes of quantum theory. Mainstream cosmological theories tend to
assume quantum theory applies to the universe, and for understandable reasons. But we don’t actually have a good
quantum theory of gravity, let alone a tested quantum theory of cosmology. On cosmological scales, it isn’t so clear
that quantum theory does actually explain all the data well.
Another obvious criticism is that we have infinitely many beable-guided quantum theories and no compelling
principle for picking out a small number of them as contenders for fundamental theories. If we think of beable-guided
quantum theories as only stepping stones towards a more compelling post-quantum theory, though, this might not be
so much of a concern either. On this view, perhaps some reasonably simple beable-guided quantum theory will turn
out to be a better theory of nature than quantum theory, but if so, we can only find out which one empirically, and
we will only understand why that particular beable-guided quantum theory is a good approximation once we have
the deeper post-quantum theory.
Another interesting speculative possibility is that a guiding condition of the sort we’ve explored might be necessary
to define a quantum theory of gravity, or to rigorously define physically relevant relativistic quantum field theories, in
the first place. The idea here is that, by rescaling the probabilities of quantum events (expressed in terms of beables),
and perhaps excluding some classes of events altogether, guiding conditions could allow rigorously defined theories to
be constructed, although the underlying unguided quantum theory is not rigorously defined or even renormalisable.
For example, in principle one could try to define a beable-guided quantum field theory that modifies the contributions
to a scattering amplitude so as to remove divergences.
Note that, even if a BGQT is constructed in a Lorentz invariant (or generally covariant) way from a similarly
invariant beable theory, it might allow superluminal signalling. Indeed, we already know that cosmological theories
with independent initial and final boundary conditions can (not surprisingly, given that they break all standard
notions of causality) allow superluminal signalling [23]. But as such theories remain consistent, and evade grandfather
paradoxes [23], it is not so clear that this should be seen as a disastrous problem. It would, in any case, be very
interesting to clarify which types of non-trivial guidance conditions prohibit superluminal signalling, which allow it
in theory but impose strong practical constraints, and which would allow it in practice with current technology.
We have presented beable-guided quantum theories in a form that perhaps fits most naturally within a block
universe picture, in which reality is defined by one configuration of beables, chosen randomly from amongst all the
possibilities. To put it picturesquely, on this view, nature’s random choice is made once, before or outside any physical
reality is created, and this choice brings into existence (in some approximate beable representation) space-time and
all events therein.
That said, nothing in the definition of beable-guided quantum theories logically implies any stronger commitment
to a block universe picture than already implied by standard quantum theory. Although the appearance of a present
time in physics is arguably puzzling in both, it is not inconsistent with either. In each case, we can calculate the
probabilities of present or near future events, conditioned on past events, for successive present times, and so recover
a dynamical picture of beable events randomly happening over time.
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